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BOOK REVIEW 
THE SECOND AMERICAN REVOLUTION, by John W. Whitehead. Elgin, 
Illinois: David C. Cook Publishing Company, 1982, pp. 253. 
Introduction 
Christian fundamentalism is America's fastest growing political, 
social, and religious movement. 1 Yet, most Americans have little 
knowledge of the fundamentalist orientation toward the political state, 
its laws, and its legal institutions. John W. Whitehead's book, The Sec-
ond American Revolution? attempts to provide a coherent statement of 
that orientation. 
The Second American Revolution seeks to function as a fundamen-
talist manifesto. The Foreward, by fundamentalist "guru" Francis A. 
Schaeffer, alludes to the book's far-reaching goals: 
If there is still an entity known as "the Christian church" by the 
end of this century, operating with any semblance of liberty 
within our society here in the United States, it will probably have 
John Whitehead and his book to thank. For this book lays the 
foundation and framework for fighting the tyrannical, secularist, 
humanistic power, which has separated our country from its 
Judeo-Christian base and now dominates this nation and its 
courts.3 
Whitehead, through simple language and clear presentation, offers his 
readers an explanation of what is wrong with contemporary legal insti-
tutions and advice on how to rid society of those ills. The increase in 
political and social visibility of fundamentalist groups4 indicates that 
1. The "fundamentalist phenomenon" became the subject of national press coverage 
only recently. Yet, the contemporacy fundamentalist movement has its roots in the mid-
1960's. See, e.g., G. CLABAUGH, THuNDER ON THE RIGHT: THE PROTESTANT FUNDAMEN-
TALISTS (1974); R. CLOUSE, R. LINDER, & R. PIERARD, PROTEST AND PoLmcs (1968). 
2. J. WHITEHEAD, THE SECOND AMERICAN REVOLUTION {1982). 
3. Schaeffer, Foreword to J. WHITEHEAD, THE SECOND AMERICAN REVOLUTION 13 
(1982). Schaeffer is the best known of the fundamentalist writers. In 1981, his A Christian 
Manifesto sold approximately 300,000 copies. See Woodward, Guru of Fundamentalism, 
NEWSWEEK, Nov. I, 1982, at 88. In many respects, A Christian Man!ftsto and 17te Second 
American Revolution make similar historical arguments to support the claim that America is 
properly a Christian state. See infta notes 15, 33 & 55. See also McCulley, Book Review, 25 
J. CHURCH & ST. 354 {1983). 
4. Although the fundamentalist movement has become more visible recently, it is diffi-
cult to assess accurately the popularity and influence of the fundamentalist voice. On the 
size of the weekly audience for broadcast religion, for example, Professor William Martin 
[505] 
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many fundamentalists are acting on the advice of activists like White-
head.5 Thus, the significance ofWhitehead,s book lies in the social con-
text that flavors the meaning of his words. 
The fundamentalists have displayed their political and social ac-
tivism in the courts and legislatures of both state and federal govern-
ment. At the federal level, fundamentalists and their New Right allies 
have alternately pushed for a constitutional amendment that will put 
prayer back in the public schools or legislation that will have the same 
effect by prohibiting federal courts from enforcing the "school prayer" . 
decision.6 They also have sought to diminish a woman's right to abor-
tion on demand through similar congressional action. 7 In the federal 
courts, fundamentalists have challenged laws mandating that their reli-
gious schools, which are not formally affiliated with a church, pay un-
cites the following media accounts: "In an August, 1980, series on the 'electronic church,' 
the New York Times quoted Armstrong's figure of 130 million without challenging it, though 
the Times did note that some estimates for individual ministers, including Falwell, appeared 
to be inflated. Earlier in the year (January 21, 1980), the Times had credited four television 
ministers with a total audience of 47 million. The Wall Street Journal said on July 11, 1980, 
that 'every week television evangelists like Oral Roberts, Pat Robertson, and Jerry Falwell 
reach an estimated 128 million viewers.' U.S. News & World Report referred in its Septem-
ber 15, 1980, issue to 'TV gospel shows beamed to 50 million viewers each week by evange-
lists such as Falwell, Robertson and [James] Robison.' In a December 8, 1979, story, United 
Press International estimated that 'about 115 million persons listened to at least one religious 
radio show and about 40 million watch at least one religious TV show each week.' An 
article in the October 6, 1980, edition of New York magazine not only set the membership of 
the electronic church at 130 million but also asserted that 'contributions to teleministries 
may be measured in the billions'-a figure far above the $500 million that newspapers and 
magazines usually attribute to the fund-raising enterprise of all radio and television minis-
tries combined. The same article credited Rex Humbard with 'playing to an audience of 100 
million worldwide.'" Martin, The Birth of a Media Myth, ATL. MoNTHLY, June 1981, at 7. 
Professor Martin, however, notes that these figures are grossly exaggerated. He argues that 
"the average weekly audience for the top ten programs is considerably smaller than . . . 
13,767,000 cumulative viewers." ld at 11. Consequently, Professor Martin concludes "that 
the impact-political or otherwise-{)[ teleministries . . . is based more on organization, 
dedication, and diligence than on overwhelming numbers." ld Also supportive of the con-
clusion that "right wing evangelical organizations" are not as politically influential as media 
reports suggest is Seymour Martin Lipset and Earl Raab's analysis of the 1980 elections. 
Lipset & Raab, The Election and the Evangelicals, COMMENTARY, Mar. 1981, at 25. 
One should not, however, underestimate the fundamentalists' influence. No matter 
which data base is used, several million Americans do tune in to broadcast religion. Addi-
tionally, mainstream politicians-both liberal and conservative-pay some attention to fun-
damentalists. Conservatives, including Representative Jack Kemp and Senator Paul Laxalt, 
have met with Francis Schaeffer. See Woodward, supra note 3, at 88. Even liberal Senator 
Edward Kennedy recently addressed Reverend Jerry Falwell's Liberty Baptist College. See 
N.Y. Times, Oct. 4, 1983, at A17, col. 1. 
5. For example, Francis Schaeffer and Jerry Falwell advance arguments similar to the 
one made by Whitehead. See i'!fra notes 14, 15, 33 & 55 and accompanying text. 
6. These efforts have failed at least temporarily, but only because of the Senate's fili-
buster rule. See Isaacson, Setback for the New Right, TIME, Sept. 27, 1982, at 12-13. 
7. See id at 12. 
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employment taxes. 8 Similarly, fundamentalists have opposed federal 
regulations that prohibit the granting of tax exemptions to scho£>ls 
whose religious practices conflict with the national policy against racial 
discri.mination.9 At the state level, they have enacted legislation that 
will deregulate fundamentalist Christian schools. 10 In conjunction with 
these efforts, fundamentalists have gone to court to have state laws reg-
ulating their schools declared unconstitutional under the religion 
clauses of the First Amendment. 11 
Despite this activism, most fundamentalists act out of a gut level 
sense of what is right and wrong. Through his book, John Whitehead 
has provided a conceptual framework to legitimize those gut level reac-
tions. In view of the impact fundamentalists have on the modem state, 
Whitehead's conceptual framework, based on the "Christia1;1 Idea," is 
worthy of description. 
I. The Christian Perspective 
The "Christian Idea" is that government should be guided by the 
teaching of the Bible. According to Whitehead, "Christians are called 
to apply God's revelation to all areas of life and to all disciplines."12 
Thus, the standard of right and wrong is based entirely on the Bible, 
not on the laws of the state. 
In light of this "Christian Idea," the fundamentalists' primary crit-
icism of the modem state is that its laws are derived from man, not 
God. This state of affairs has been labeled "humanism" by the funda-
mentalists. Whitehead defines humanism as "the fundamental idea 
that men and women can begin from themselves without reference to 
the Bible and, by reasoning outward, derive the standards to judge all 
matters."13 Its danger is that "[t]here are no standards that cannot be 
eroded or replaced by what seems necessary, expedient, or even fash-
8. See, e.g., United States v. Grace Brethren Church, 457 U.S. 393 (1982). 
9. See, e.g., Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 468 F. Supp. 890 (D.S.C. 1978), rev'd, 
639 F.2d 147 (4th Cir. 1981), '!ffd, 461 U.S. 574 (1983); Goldsboro Christian Schools, Inc. v. 
United States, 436 F. Supp. 1314 (E.D.N.C. 1977), qfjd mem., 644 F.2d 879 (4th Cir. 1981), 
t!ff'd, 103 S. Ct. 2017 (1983). See also infra text accompanying notes 60-61. 
10. Alabama and North Carolina have recently passed legislation that effectively der-
egulates fundamentalist schools while Idaho and Colorado have declined to adopt measures 
that would have subjected those schools to state regulation. The fundamentalists have also 
sought to enact deregulatory legislation in Pennsylvania, Maine, and Nebraska. See Devins, 
Fundamentalist Schools vs. The Regulators, WALL ST. J., Apr. 14, 1983, at 28. 
11. See Devins, A Fundamentalist Right to Education?, THE NAT'L L.J., Feb. 21, 1983, at 
13. 
12. J. WHITEHEAD, supra note 2, at 27. 
13. ld. at 38. 
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ionable at the time." 14 
Whitehead's thesis, which he claims is based on both history and 
practicality, is that the Bible should serve as the foundation for Ameri-
can thought and decisionmaking. As an historical matter, Whitehead 
states that: 
In seeking independence from Great Britain the colonists de-
clared to the world their belief in a personal, infinite God-"their 
Creator"-who endowed them with "certain unalienable" or ab-
solute rights. To the men of that time, it was self-evident that if 
there was no God there could be no absolute rights. . . . [T]he 
American colonists knew very well that if the unalienable rights 
they were urging for were not seen in the context of J udeo-Chris-
tian theism, they were without content. 15 
As a practical matter, Whitehead contends that "whenever a culture 
establishes its institutions upon the teachings of the Bible, it is able to 
have freedom in society and government."16 
The Christian view is that law and morality exist as a single insep-
arable entity based on the Bible. For the fundamentalists, the rise and 
widespread acceptance of humanism has resulted in "the non-Chris-
tian's usurpation of the cultural mandate against the terms of the Bi-
ble."17 Consequently, Whitehead concludes that "our government has 
also become a religion and is already involved in bitter conflict with the 
religion of Christ. Obviously, Christianity and the new state religion of 
America cannot peacefully coexist."18 
II. A Christian Analysis of the Contemporary State and Its 
Legal Institutions 
Whitehead's criticisms of the modern state are blunt and severe. 
As an operating principle, Whitehead contends that: "When a state 
claims divine honors, there will always be warfare between Christ and 
Caesar, for two rival gods claim the same jurisdiction over man. It is a 
conflict between two kingdoms, between two kings, each of who~ 
14. /d. Francis Schaeffer similarly comments: "Humanism, with its lack of any final 
base for values or law, always leads to chaos." F. SCHAEFFER, A CHRISTIAN MANIFESTO 29 
(rev. ed. 1982). 
15. J. WHITEHEAD, supra note 2, at 32. Jerry Falwell, in specifying the primary areas of 
disagreement between the humanist liberals and religious conservatives, notes: "It is not the 
religious conservatives in this country who have politicized the Gospel. It is the liberal in 
the church and in the government who has turned the basic moral values that were the 
foundation of this country into political issues. Until recently, most people agreed that abor-
tion is murder, that homosexual practice is perversion and that pornography is the exploita-
tion of women and men." Falwell, The Maligned Moral Majority, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 21, 1981, 
at 17. See also F. ScHAEFFER, supra note 14, at 31-40. 
16. J. WHITEHEAD, supra note 2, at 23-24. 
17. /d. at 27. 
18. /d. at 18. 
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claims ultimate and divine powers."19 In relating this proposition to 
contemporary American society, Whitehead alleges that "we are in-
volved in the same head-to-head confrontation in the United States to-
day. The state-the federal bureaucracy and the courts-have [sic] 
become the modem divinity."20 Whitehead thus concludes that "[t]he 
humanistic consensus is interested in eliminating Christianity, because 
individual Christians have an absolute standard by which to judge the 
system."21 Examples of America's deviation from its biblical origins 
are the legalizing abortion and euthanasia, developing test tube babies, 
recognizing gay rights, teaching evolution, and prohibiting prayer, Bi-
ble reading, and posting the Ten Commandments in public schools.22 
The failure of the modem state, according to Whitehead, is "[t]he 
failure of Christianity to influence society."23 Thus, instead of being a 
country whose operations are grounded in its biblical heritage, 
America is "saturated with a new system of arbitrary absolutes, a philo-
sophical relativism that changes with opinion but that demands sub-
mission to its arbitrary will of the moment."24 
Whitehead blames the judiciary for the humanistic transformation 
of American society. The principal source of this transformation is the 
Supreme Court's recognition of an individual's fundamental right to 
privacy. 25 Whitehead claims that this privacy right "places man at the 
center with no other reference point. First, God is set aside, then others 
(for example, the unborn child), until, in the end, everything is seen in 
utilitarian terms."26 Related to this development has been an alteration 
in the structure of legal analysis, from a biblically based common law 
19. Id. 
20. Id. 
21. Id. at 40. 
22. Similarly, the Reverend Jerry Falwell labels secular humanism a "satanic influ-
ence." According to Falwell, secular humanism "challenges every principle on which 
America was founded. It advocates abortion-on-demand, recognition of homosexuals, free 
use of pornography, legalizing of prostitution and gambling, and free use of drugs, among 
other things." K.rauthammer, The Humanist Phantom, THE NEW REPUBLIC, July 25, 1981, at 
20. 
Mel Gabler, founder of the ultraconservative Educational Research Analysis, labels 
public schools as "government seminaries" of secular humanism. I d. at 21. Consequently, 
his organization advises public school officials not to purchase textbooks influenced by such 
humanistic features as situation ethics, evolution, negations of Christianity, and sexual free-
dom. See generally A. SHUPE & W. STACEY, BoRN AGAIN POLITICS AND THE MORAL MA-
JORITY 29-45 (1980). 
23. J. WHITEHEAD, supra note 2, at 41. 
24. Id. at 41-42. 
25. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. I 13 (1973); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 
{1965). Ironically, the fundamentalists make use of these "privacy" decisions in arguing that 
their schools should not be regulated by the state-contending that parents have a funda-
mental right to direct the upbringing of their children. 
26. J. WHITEHEAD, supra note 2, at 115. 
510 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol.ll:505 
system to the current system of legal positivism based on precedent.27 
Whitehead argues in favor of the common law system of law ad-
vanced in Blackstone's Commentaries,28 summarizing Blackstone's 
thinking as follows: 
Blackstone, a Christian, believed that the fear of the Lord 
was the beginning of wisdom. Thus he opened his Commentaries 
with a careful analysis of the law of God as revealed in the Bible. 
He defined law as a rule of a<;tion, which is prescribed by some 
superior, and which the inferior is bound to obey.29 
Law, as Whitehead interprets Blackstone, is God-made, not judge-
made. Accordingly, the judiciary's role is to make known and validate 
the unwritten common law, not to create its own man-made law.30 
Whitehead is particularly critical of contemporary legal education 
for its fostering of humanistic values. On this subject, he contends that 
the culture is producing legal technicians who have little appreci-
ation for the broader aspects of the law. Today the law student 
. . . is instructed to become a legal technician in every area of 
business: contracts, corporations, and commercial transactions. 
He also may become an analytical expert in courtroom tactics, 
but he often works with little consideration of what the public 
looks for in the courtroom: justice.31 
Whitehead also attributes the "humanization" of law to the case 
method of instruction commonly used at law schools. In his opinion, 
that form of instruction inevitably leads to a system of legal positivism 
and the belief that laws are merely what the judges say they are. 
Whitehead thus rejects the common perception that the basic principles 
and doctrines of the legal system are the product of an evolving process 
of judge-made law.32 
According to Whitehead, our legal system's reliance on precedents 
has resulted in a shift in constitutional interpretation by the courts. He 
argues that ''with the substitution of sociological jurisprudence for the 
Judea-Christian base, the doctrine of judicial review has become a tyr-
annous device. It places the entire government under the authority of 
the Supreme Court . . . ."33 To demonstrate this point, Whitehead 
contrasts the perspective of John Marshall, the Court's first Chief Jus-
27. Id at 54. 
28. W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF ENGLAND (London 1807-1822). 
29. J . WHITEHEAD, supra note 2, at 31. 
30. Id at 54. 
31. ld at 44. 
32. ld at 54. 
33. ld See also F. SCHAEFFER, supra note 14, at 41-51, 81-82. The Reverend Jerry 
Falwell is also alarmed by the "humanistic" courts' interference with traditional Judea-
Christian values: ''The government [has been) encroaching upon the sovereignty of both the 
Church and the family. The Supreme Court had legalized abortion on demand ...• Most 
Americans were shocked, but kept hoping someone would do something about all this moral 
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tice, with that of Donald E. Santarelli, an associate deputy attorney 
general in the Nixon Administration. Marshall wrote, in Osborn v. 
United States Bank, 34 that: 
Judicial power, as contradistinguished from the power of the 
laws, has no existence. Courts are mere instruments of the law, 
and can will nothing .... Judicial power is never exercised for 
the purpose of giving effect to the will of the judge; always for the 
purpose of giving effect ... to the will of the Iaw.35 
Directly contradicting Marshall's view, Santarelli commented that: 
The Constitution is flexible. . . . Your point of view depends on 
whether you're winning. . . . The Constitution isn't the real is-
sue in this; it's how you want to run the country, and achieve na-
tional goals. The language of the Constitution is not at issue. It 
is what you can interpret it to mean in the light of modem needs. 
In talking about a "Constitutional crisis" we are not grappling 
with the real needs of running the country but are using the issues 
for the self-serving purpose of striking a new balance of 
power .... Today, the whole Constitution is up for grabs.36 
These conflicting views regarding the scope of judicial review in 
the constitutional scheme have been labeled "interpretivism" and 
"noninterpretivism."37 Interpretivism signifies the view that constitu-
tional interpretation should be based solely on the actual language of 
the Constitution. Noninterpretivism connotes the view that the Consti-
tution is a living document whose meaning can be gleaned from its 
purpose and from events surrounding its drafting. Whitehead argues 
that the Constitution is biblically based; thus, strict construction is pre-
ferred because it is apt to further Judea-Christian values.38 Whitehead 
also suggests that the noninterpretivistic approach results in humanistic 
judge-made law. Echoing some of Whitehead's views, Judge Robert 
Bork has commented: 
There may be a conventional morality in our society, but on most 
issues there are likely to be several moralities. They are often 
regionally defined, which is one reason for federalism. The judge 
has no way of choosing among differing moralities or competing 
moralities except in accordance with his own morality.39 
Whitehead's view on the propriety of interpretivistic constitutional 
discussion is reflected in his discussion of Supreme Court decisions that 
chaos." E. DOBSON & E. HINDSON, THE FUNDAMENTALIST PHENOMENON: THE RESUR-
GENCE OF CONSERVATIVE CHRISTIANITY 188 (J. Falwell ed. 1981). 
34. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824). 
35. Id. at 866. 
36. The Talk of the Town, THE NEW YORKER, Apr. 28, 1973, at 34. 
37. See generally J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL RE-
VIEW (1980). 
38. J. WHITEHEAD, supra note 2, at 54. 
39. Bork, The Struggle Over the Role of the Court, NAT'L REv., Sept. 17, 1982, at 1138. 
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impact on religious freedom.40 Typical of this interpretivistic analysis 
is Whitehead's discussion of Court decisions pre-dating the growth of 
humanism:41 
The court's function was to arrive at a just result, but in 
terms of the higher law. Thus, the courts were not obliged to 
enforce a law that was unjust in terms of the Bible . . . . 
This is well illustrated by a series of Supreme Court cases in 
the late nineteenth century, in which congressional acts against 
bigamy were upheld. Those laws were aimed at the practice of 
polygamy then current among Mormons. Underlying the Court's 
approval of this legislation was the fact that polygamy was con-
trary to Christian moral standards. The Court's decisions were 
thus premised upon what was right or wrong according to its ref-
erence point in the Bible.42 
One of these Court opinions went so far as to say that "[t]he term 'reli-
gion' has reference to one's views of his relations to his Creator 
• • • ."
43 Whitehead makes use of similar reasoning to criticize a series 
of Supreme Court decisions in the 1960's relating to the conscientious 
objector status of Vietnam draft resisters. Most disturbing to White-
head is the decision in United States v. Seeger,44 in which the Court 
defined religion as all sincere beliefs "based upon a power or being, or 
upon a faith, to which all else is subordinate or upon which all else is 
ultimately dependent."45 In Seeger, the Judeo-Christian God did not 
serve as a reference point for religious belief. Thus, according to 
Whitehead, the Seeger decision signifies that "belief or disbelief in the 
Christian view of God is no longer relevant in defining religion under 
the First Am.endment."46 
Whitehead closes his analysis of recent religion clause decisions by 
concluding that the Supreme Court has effectively secularized the First 
Amendment. Of particular concern to him is the 1980 decision in 
40. It must be noted that Whitehead assumes that the meanings of the terms in the 
Constitution are grounded in biblical mores. In other words, Whitehead feels that American 
jurisprudence ought to conform to Christian values. 
41. Whitehead does not attribute the advent of humanism to a specific event. He sug-
gests that humanism began to spread after the release of Darwin's Origin of the Species in 
1859 and after the end of the American Civil War in 1865. J. WHITEHEAD, supra note 2, at 
36. On the subject of the American legal system, Whitehead posits that humanistic legal 
positivism started to grow when "Christopher Langdell, dean of the Harvard Law School, 
began to apply Darwinian thought to legal education ... {through] the 'case method' of 
teaching law:• Id at 46. Whitehead contends that humanistic thought became more perva-
sive in the early part of the century during the Lochner era. ld at 119-20. See Lochner v. 
New York, 198 U.S. 74 (1905). 
42. J. WHITEHEAD, supra note 2, at 87-88. 
43. Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 342 (1890). 
44. 380 u.s. 163 (1965). 
45. Id at 176. 
46. J. WHITEHEAD, supra note 2, at 108. 
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Stone v. Graham.41 In that case, the Court struck down a Kentucky law 
requiring the posting of the Ten Commandments in public school class-
rooms. The Court held that the Ten Commandments were "plainly 
religious" and may "induce the school children to read, meditate upon, 
perhaps to venerate and obey, the Commandments."48 Whitehead 
views this decision as signifying that "the First Amendment can allow 
only 'secular' activity in the public schools of America" for "if they [the 
Ten Commandments] were taken seriously, in the Christian sense, they 
would be against the law."49 
Whitehead rejects the development of the modem humanistic 
state. In particular, he objects to the recognition of the right to privacy, 
which permits abortions, 5° and the right to die, which permits euthana-
sia. 51 The perceived shift from biblical revelation to humanism, for 
Whitehead, already has led to moral corruption and ultimately will 
lead to the demise of individual liberty in the modem state. 
III. The Christian Response 
In an attempt to formulate a plan of action to combat humanism, 
Whitehead argues that: 
It is time to shed the naive idea that the modem humanistic 
state exists to perpetuate good government. . . . It is also time to 
discard the idea that Christians can simply go about their busi-
ness, neither looking to the left nor to the right. Every true Chris-
tian is in some way on an eventual collision course with the 
modem technological state, and he should be prepared for it.52 
According to Whitehead, "[p ]rotest is our most viable alternative at this 
time in history."53 
Whitehead believes that this Christian protest ought to manifest 
itself in both lawful and unlawful behavior. On one hand, Whitehead 
encourages mainstream activity such as letter writing, participation on 
local school boards, voting, and speaking out intelligently on social is-
sues. 54 On the other hand, Whitehead writes of the" 'duty to disobey 
the state.' " 55 For him, "[c]itizens have a moral obligation to resist un-
47. 449 U.S. 39 (1980) (per curiam). 
48. Jd at 42. 
49. J. WHITEHEAD, supra note 2, at 110. 
50. Id at 121-24. 
51. Jd at 138-39. 
52. Jd at 145-46. 
53. Jd at 156 (emphasis added). 
54. Jd at 166. 
~5. Jd at 151 (quoting F. ScHAEFFER, supra note 14, at 93). Francis Schaeffer similarly 
contends that "[i]f a law [is not grounded in the Judea-Christian tradition and consequently] 
is wrong, you must disobey it." F. SCHAEFFER, supra note 14, at 66 (emphasis ommitted). 
Schaeffer bases his theory of civil disobedience on Samuel Rutherford's Lex Rex. See F. 
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just and tyrannical government."56 But unlike Martin Luther King, Jr., 
who felt that an individual must accept state prescribed punishment for 
his· civil disobedience, 57 Whitehead advocates a much more disruptive 
form of protest. For example, he postulates that: 
The Supreme Court cannot execute its own decisions. The entire 
system depends on people following what the Court says. The 
time may have come when a local community or state may have 
to disobey the Supreme Court or other Federal and state agencies 
that act contrary to the principles of the Bible. 58 
Accordingly, Whitehead concludes his book by calling for "a revolu-
tion promulgated to be a total assault on the humanistic culture. A 
Second American Revolution founded upon the Bible in its totality. In 
this, and only this, is there hope for the future."59 
IV. Relevance of The Second American Revolution 
The theory of judicial decisionmaking advanced in The Second 
American Revolution is a broadside critique of conventional wisdom 
and jurisprudence. Whitehead advocates both the suppression of 
"non-Christian" thought60 and the displacement of the contemporary 
secular state.61 Thus, Whitehead's vision of "Christian America" is di-
rectly opposed to the values embodied in the freedoms of religion, ex-
pression, and association-values that are generally perceived as the 
cornerstones of American democracy.62 Additionally, Whitehead ar-
gues that constitutional analysis should be predicated upon a literal in-
terpretation of the Bible;63 he advocates the substitution of the 
"biblically" based common law system for precedent based decision-
making.64 Finally, Whitehead demands that legal arguments be based 
on what is biblically "right" and thus surreptitiously calls for the aban-
donment of the adversary system of justice.65 
ScHAEFFER, supra note 14, at 99-109. For a critique of Schaeffer's analysis, see McCulley, 
supra note 3. 
56. J. WHITEHEAD, supra note 2, at 154 (emphasis original). 
57. King, Letter from Birmingham Jai/(1963), reprinted in 8 ANNALS OF AMERICA 143 
(1968). 
58. J. WHITEHEAD, supra note 2, at 158. 
59. Jd at 180. 
60. See supra note 46 and accompanying text. 
61. See supra note 52 and accompanying text. 
62. As Justice Jackson stated: ''The very purpo~e of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw 
certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the reach 
of majorities and officials and to establish them as legal principles to be applied by the 
courts." West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943). 
63. See supra note 42 and accompanying text. 
64. See supra notes 28-29 and accompanying text. 
65. See supra note 31 and accompanying text. 
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An examination of case law has no place in a critical analysis of 
Whitehead's thesis, for his thinking is alien to the values underlying 
American jurisprudence. Whitehead's debunking of our legal system 
derives from the two basic premises that the founding fathers intended 
America to be a "Christian" state en perpetuo66 and that a "Christian" 
state is the most desirable form of government.67 A critique of The 
Second American Revolution then must focus on the accuracy of those 
premises. 
Whitehead's notion that his thinking reflects the "true" American 
perspective is fundamentally flawed for two reasons. First, White-
head's historical analysis is inaccurate. Second, history is only one fac-
tor in constitutional interpretation; so even if Whitehead's historical 
premise is accurate, his conclusions are still wrong. 
The scholarly debate over the Framers' intent in drafting the Con-
stitution and Bill of Rights is legion.68 Yet, "[b]y the time of the draft-
ing . . . , opinions in favor of general religious liberty and disestab-
lishment of official churches were widespread. The principal debate 
was over how far disestablishment should go and whether such dises-
tablishment implied total separation of religion and government or 
merely separation of government from any particular church."69 Ac-
cording to Mark DeWolfe Howe, the theory upon which the Constitu-
tion was based 
excluded much more than religion from the competence of gov-
ernment, for it contained at its center the concept of inalienable 
rights-the thesis, that is, that the law of nature renders wholly 
void any turning over of private liberty or immunity to the rule of 
public authority. The principal function of a bill or declaration 
of rights was to define the areas of personal autonomy wherein 
the writ of government could not run. Within such protected ar-
eas of immunity, private liberties would freely grow and 
fiourish.70 
Whitehead's contention that "Christian" values were intended to per-
meate American government is thus contrary to the spirit of liberty 
which underlies the Constitution. 
Whitehead's belief that America was designed to be a "Christian" 
state is probably based on the fact that during the Revolutionary War 
66. See supra note 15 and accompanying text. 
67. See supra note 16 and accompanying text. 
68. See generally L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CoNSTITUTIO,NAL LAW 816-19 (1978); CoNGRES-
SIONAL REsEARCH SERVICE, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 912-
13 (1972) . 
. 69. Hitchcock, The Supreme Court and Religion: Historical Overview and Future Prog-
nosis, 24 ST. LOUIS U.L.J. 183, 183-84 (1980). See a/so Note, Toward a Constitutional .Defini-
tion of Religion, 91 HARV. L. Rev. 1056, 1057-60 (1978). 
70. M. HOWE, THE GARDEN AND THE WILDERNESS 18 (1965). 
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era most Americans were Christians, 71 and American courts continued 
to follow the Christian influenced common law.72 In fact, many of the 
original states had established Protestant Christianity as the official 
state religion.73 Yet, there was a substantial non-Christian population 
at this time,74 and several states had enacted anti-establishment provi-
sions.75 More significantly the Framers of the Constitution believed in 
equality of opportunity among religions and religious thought.76 
Whitehead's historical premise, therefore, appears inaccurate. Ad-
ditionally, even if it is accurate, history is not the controlling factor in 
constitutional adjudication. According to Arthur Miller, "the Constitu-
tion is an evolving institution and ... the Supreme Court's decisions 
have had the effect of updating a document drafted in far different 
times for far different problems."77 Laurence Tribe likewise states: 
[I]n the end it is the text [of the Constitution] that invites a 
collaborative inquiry, involving both the Court and the country, 
into the contemporary contents and demands of freedom, fair-
71. Joseph Story wrote: "[A]t the time of the adoption of the Constitution ..• the 
general if not universal sentiment in America was, that Christianity ought to receive encour-
agement from the state so far as was not incompatible with the private rights o/ conscience, and 
the freedom o/ religious worship." 3 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF 
THE UNITED STATES 726 (reprinted. New York 1970) (emphasis added). 
72. Professor Howe notes: "[Jefferson] had always been uncomfortably aware of the 
closeness of the affiliation between Christianity and the common law and had developed an 
ingenious and learned argument against the assertion that Christianity is part of the com-
mon law . . . . On the whole, however, Jefferson's effort had little effect on the decision of 
cases in American courts administering the common law. The judges found it very easy to 
repeat the old maxim and to find reasons (or other grounds) for discrediting the endeavor of 
Jefferson." M. HowE, supra note 70, at 27-28. 
73. See, e.g., id at 41: "In the remarkable constitution which South Carolina adopted in 
1778 it was stated that 'the Christian Protestant religion shall be deemed ... the established 
religion of this State.'" But if. 3 THORPE, FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS 1889 (1909) 
(Massachusetts anti-establishment provision). 
74. See S. AHLSTROM, A RELIGIOUS HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE 360-84 
(1972); B. BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 249-52 
(1967). 
75. Virginia's Act for Establishing Religious Freedom, for example, stated that "forcing 
[a man] to support this or that teacher ... is depriving him of the comfortable liberty of 
giving his contributions to the particular pastor, whose morals he would make his pattern, or 
whose powers he feels most persuasive to righteousness." M. HowE, supra note 70, at 2 
(citing 12 HENING, STATUTES AT LARGE 84-85 (1823)). 
76. See G. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787, at 427-28 
(1969). 
77. Miller, Notes on the Concept '![the "Living" Constitution, 31 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 
881, 881 (1963). Paul Freund similarly refers to the Constitution as "[a] work of art in its 
capacity to respond through interpretation to changing needs, concerns, and aspirations." 
Freund, New Vistas in Constitutional Law, 112 U. PA. L. REV. 631, 645-46 (1964); see also 
Hyman & Newhouse, Standards for Preftrred Freedoms: Beyond the First, 60 Nw. U.L. REv. 
1 (1965); McKay, Stability and Change in Constitutional Law, 17 VAND. L. REV. 203 (1963); 
Van Loan, Natural Rights and the Ninth Amendment, 48 B.U.L. REv. 1 (1968). 
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ness, and fraternity. The text does so through majestic generali-
ties that plainly summon judges and lawmakers alike to a task 
which simply cannot be understood as the deciphering of an an-
cient scroll .... 78 
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This perception-that the Constitution is a "living" document-has al-
ways been shared by the courts. In 1819, Chief Justice John Marshall 
contended that the Constitution was "intended to endure for ages to 
come, and, consequently, to be adapted to the various crises of human 
affairs. "79 In 1821, Marshall similarly characterized the Constitution as 
"framed for ages to come, and ... designed to approach immortality, 
as nearly as human institutions can approach it."80 Today, the Consti-
tution has "evolved" to include a right of privacy that guarantees wo-
men the right to obtain an abortion, 81 a right to equal protection under 
the laws that insures a free education to the children of illegal aliens, 82 
and a right to due process of law that prohibits a public school from 
suspending a student without a hearing. 83 
John Whitehead is dissatisfied with the evolution of constitutional 
law. Yet, even if some jurists have improperly extended the rule of 
law, constitutional interpretation must respond to contemporary 
needs. 84 The Constitution was drafted in sufficiently general terms to 
allow such interpretation. Additionally, "[t]he cautious development of 
unenumerated constitutional rights permits the Court to react to the 
novel social, political, and economic demands placed upon the Consti-
tution."85 Just as stomach pumping designed to obtain evidence is 
"conduct that shocks the conscience" and thus is violative of the due 
process clause,86 John Whitehead's model of Christian supremacy is 
too repugnant to contemporary pluralistic concerns for that model to 
be justified solely on historical grounds. 
Once the historical bubble that underlies Whitehead's thesis is 
burst, Whitehead's argument becomes a normative advocacy of the vir-
tues of and the necessity for Christian life in a Christian state. 87 
78. L. TRIBE, supra note 68, at 566 (emphasis original). 
79. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 415 (1819). 
80. Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 387 (1821). 
81. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
82. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982). 
83. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975). 
84. See generally R. McCLOSKEY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME CoURT (1960). 
85. Van Loan, supra note 77, at 37. 
86. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952). 
87. In addition to the inadequacy of Whitehead's historical analysis, Whitehead does 
not discuss issues that do not correspond with his thesis; these issues, however, are pertinent 
to an understanding of the fundamentalist movement. 
Whitehead repeatedly points out that we need to return to the Bible because "[w]ords 
have meaning only in terms of their reference point." J. WHITEHEAD, supra note 2, at 181. 
Yet, what is most striking about Whitehead's book is its total omission of any discussion of 
the current controversy over fundamentalist Christian schools. This issue centers on the 
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America, however, is not and should not be subject to totalitarian 
rule-whether it be under the auspices of the Ayatollah K.homeini or 
John W. Whitehead. 88 
Whitehead demands that the American legal system "return" to its 
Christian roots. If this proposition were adopted, however, a great 
many of the advances made by religious groups over the past fifty years 
would be undercut. 89 This assumption seems realistic in light of the 
fact that Whitehead supports court decisions such as the Mormon po-
fundamentalists' willing exodus from mainstream society. In other words, fundamentalist 
educators are seeking to isolate themselves from society, not to change it. See generally 
Devins, State Regulation o/ Christian Schools, 10 J. LEGIS. 351 (1983). 
The Christian school issue has taken shape both in the courts and in the legislatures. 
See Devins, supra note 10. In courts, fundamentalist Christian educators claim that a consti-
tutionally unjustifiable stranglehold is being placed on their religious liberty by state laws 
and bureaucracies. The issues in these cases center on efforts by state educational agencies 
to license private schools, as well as to prescribe course offerings and teacher qualifications 
in those schools. In state legislatures, fundamentalists are seeking to have legislation en-
acted that will effectively deregulate their schools. See supra notes 10-11 and accompanying 
text. 
Whitehead purposely bypasses discussion of this issue. He cannot claim ignorance of it, 
however, since he has defended the fundamentalists in court. See infra note 95 and accom-
panying text. Apparently, Whitehead felt it best to omit discussion of an issue which sug-
gests that the fundamentalists want to isolate themselves from the rest of society. 
88. This analogy is extreme. Yet, The Second American Revolution is so narrowly fo-
cused that Whitehead has opened himself up to this type of criticism. In other writings, 
Whitehead takes a more reasonable approach and urges that Christians must actively par-
ticipate in society if they want Christian values to be an integral part of the social order. 
See, e.g., Whitehead, The Boston Tea Party 1982?, CHRISTIANITY TODAY, Nov. 12, 1982, at 
28. He has also recognized that America is a pluralistic country. See generally J. WHITE-
HEAD, THE NEW TYRANNY (1982). 
89. Whitehead apparently defines religion as belief in the Judea-Christian God. Thus, 
so-called "fringe" religious groups such as the "Moonies" and "Hare Krishnas" would not 
be protected by the Constitution's free exercise or establishment clauses. Additionally, 
under Whitehead's scheme, religious liberty protections would not be extended to estab-
lished Eastern religions such as Taoism, Buddhism, and Confucianism. 
Whitehead's narrow definition of religion has been rejected both by the courts and by 
most fundamentalist attorneys. The prevailing view pertaining to the definition of religion 
was recently explicated in a concurring opinion by Judge Goldberg in Brown v. Dade Chris-
tian Schools, Inc., 556 F.2d 310, 317-18 (5th Cir. 1977): "One person's heresy can be an-
other's religion. It is extremely important that religion be defined in such a manner that 
labeling does not become the touchstone of constitutional analysis. . . . Religions can have 
abhorrent principles; most religious practices are benign, benevolent and beneficent. But we 
should not judge a religion by its practices. One era's spiritual error is another's heralded 
religion." In a similar vein, Laurence Tribe contends that "all that is arguably religious 
should be considered religious in a free exercise analysis." L. TRIBE, supra note 68, at 828. 
This contention is also supported by a number of Supreme Court decisions. For example, in 
United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 86 (1944), the Court held that "the truth or verity of 
. . . religious doctrines or beliefs" could not be considered by a judge or jury without violat-
ing the free exercise clause. Likewise, in Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U.S. 67, 70 (1953), the 
Court held that "it is no business of courts to say what is a religious practice or activity for 
one group is not religion under the protection of the First Amendment." 
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lygamy cases,90 which limited the freedoms of religious minorities, and 
criticizes decisions such as the draft resister cases,91 which expanded 
the reach of religious liberty protections. Ultimately, Whitehead wants 
American society to become monotheistic. For him, permissible and 
impermissible behavior ought to be judged according to a literal inter-
pretation of the Bible. Constitutional analysis would be derived from 
select pulpits instead of from the courts. Under this regime, for exam-
ple, there could be no objection to the persecution of religious groups 
whose practices were not consistent with the terms of the Bible. As 
Paul Kauper, one of this nation's strongest advocates for religious lib-
erty, contends in his Religion and the Constitution: 
It is not the business of the churches-and here let me speak par-
ticularly of the Christian churches-to seek to make a Christian 
state out of the nation or to Christianize the law. State, govern-
ment, and law are necessarily secular in character. The positive 
law and the institutions of government are concerned not with 
correct belief but with overt conduct related to good order, peace, 
justice, freedom, and community welfare. Churches transgress 
their proper function when they attempt to impose their own pe-
culiar moral beliefs derived from religious insight upon others 
who do not share these beliefs and insights. It is imperative that 
in our pluralistic society no church_ seek the sanction of law for its 
own moral conceptions unless they are translatable into moral 
values and social policy appropriate to the purposes of the secu-
lar community. Churches are tempted to seek legislative sanction 
for their moral insights and thereby to impose their will upon the 
whole community. This leads them to ignore the fact that secular 
government is concerned with moral motivation only insofar as it 
relates to overt conduct prejudicial to the interests and values 
served by the law. They tend to disregard the freedom of those 
whose moral attitudes are totally different.92 
In many frightening ways, Whitehead's "ideal" world is similar to 
the "secular'' world that he is trying to abolish. For Whitehead, the 
"secular" world denies Christian values and thus must be overcome. 
But the "Christian" world proffered by Whitehead similarly would 
deny non-Christian values; it would involve a closed system opposed to 
either the toleration or respect of minority views. 
90. See supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text. 
91. See supra notes 44-46 and accompanying text. 
92. P. KAUPER, RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION 83-84 (1964). Regarding the beliefs 
of Christian fundamentalists, Peter Skerry aptly notes: "The curious tendency of today's 
fundamentalists 'to have it both ways' constitutes the essence of the historical relationship 
between fundamentalists and American society. They have always been a unique group of 
traditionalists, in that their beliefs include a long established commitment to the least tradi-
tional of all societies. They have long had to deal with the dilemma that their future as well 
as their past is bound up with the fate of the one nation that, as de Tocqueville first noted, 
was born modem." Skerry, Book Review, CoMMENTARY, May 1982, at 98-104. 
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Contradicting Whitehead's argument, fundamentalist attorneys 
have stressed in court the importance of religious pluralism and the 
concomitant respect due to divergent religious perspectives.93 For ex-
ample, Internal Revenue Service efforts to deny tax exempt status to 
private schools whose religious practices are inconsistent with federal 
policies have been criticized as follows: 
[T]he danger posed by the revenue procedure is that it may effec-
tively impose severe economic pressures on all religions to follow 
a federally approved dogma. Unless a church stays in step with 
federal policy it will lose its tax exemption. Such application of 
the law will inevitably lead the government to favor those reli-
gious organizations that parrot federal policy over those that do 
not. The indirect effect of this will be to impose a federal pres-
ence upon religion contrary to the fundamental premise of the 
religion clauses of the first amendment.94 
John Whitehead is himself quite familiar with this "religious plural-
ism" argument. In fact, he made effective use of the argument in State 
v. Nobe/,95 a significant Christian school lawsuit. 
The apparent conflict between Whitehead's legal argument and his 
political advocacy is reminiscent of the Nazi efforts to march in Skokie, 
Illinois. The Nazis argued in court that America's respect for divergent 
and conflicting thought-as exemplified in the protection afforded by 
the First Amendment's Freedom of Speech and Association Clauses-
guaranteed them the right to speak out against that very same protec-
tion.96 This type of inconsistency, however, does not justify disregard-
ing or making light of the associational freedoms of the Nazis or the 
religious freedoms of individuals such as Whitehead. Whitehead, like 
anyone else, ought to be able to speak his mind and practice his reli-
gion-as long as his activities do not interfere with the rights of others 
to do the same. As Justice Jackson put it, "[i]fthere is any fixed star in 
our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can 
prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or 
other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their 
faith therein."97 
93. See Devins, Fundamentalist Schools and the Law, Christian Sci. Monitor, Sept. 22, 
1982, at 23, col. l; see generally Devins, State Regulation, supra note 87; Devins, supra note 
10; Devins, supra note 11. 
94. Neuberger & Crumplar, Tax Exempt Religious Schools Under Attack: Conflicting 
Goals of Religious Freedom and Racial Integration, 48 FoRDHAM L. REv. 229, 273 (1979). 
95. No. S-7-91-0114-A, slip op. Michigan District Court, Allegan City, (Dec. 12, 1979) 
(Michigan teacher certification law held unconstitutional under First Amendment Free E~ 
ercise Clause). 
96. See Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 916 (1978). 
97. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) 
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Unfortunately, Whitehead's thesis of Christian supremacy is op-
posed to those pluralistic concerns that require a careful analysis of his 
views. 98 For this reason, The Second American Revolution is ultimately 
dissatisfying. 
Neal .Devinr 
98. James E. Wood, Jr., editor of TlzeJoumal of Church and State, reached an identical 
conclusion in his discussion of modem day fundamentalist beliefs and practices: "By con-
fusing moral absolutes with public policy, anyone who dissents is identified with immorality 
and is in conflict with the will of God. The pluralism of America's faiths, not to mention the 
almost 80 million persons who remain without any religious affiliation, is ignored as well as 
the essential safeguards of a free society. The religious vision of the nation held by the New 
Religious Right may be in harmony with America's theocrats, past and present, but it is out 
of character with the founding of this nation and the guarantees of the First Amendment." 
Wood, ReligioiiS Fundamentalism and the New Right, 22 1. CHURCH & ST. 409, 420 (1980). 
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